Creativity and Complexity in Post-WTO China by Keane, Michael
 1
Copyright 2003 Taylor & Francis.  First published as: 
Keane, Michael A (2003) Creativity and complexity in post-WTO China. Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural 
Studies  17(3):pp. 291-301. 
 
 
 
Creativity and complexity in post-WTO China 
 
 
MICHAEL KEANE  
Queensland University of Technology 
 
In this paper I discuss the changing relations between culture, services, and knowledge in China.1 In arguing that these 
three formerly separate conceptual domains are converging I am mindful of a global shift in thinking about the 
management of national content industries as they react to the pressures of global trade agreements, new regional 
market dynamics, and digitisation. These three vectors of change underscore the ensuing discussion. Moreover, while 
understandings of culture as works of great artistic achievement, or residual cultural traditions, will undoubtedly remain 
central to processes of identity formation, the cultural model that is likely to gain the attention of governments in the 
next decade is concerned with culture’s integration into service sector facilitation. Cultural and information services 
have provided an impetus for business expansion and networking on a scale unparalleled in previous accounts of 
globalisation (cf Hirst and Thompson, 1995). Based on economic development rationales, a relationship of dependency 
between culture and services is fairly self-evident and is illustrated by increasing user-customisation of services that are 
delivered electronically. The connection with the knowledge economy however requires some further conceptual 
ground clearing. In short, as state policy formerly concerned with cultural preservation and protection is increasingly 
migrating to view culture in terms of intellectual property, economic investment is shifting from industrial to 
knowledge-based production. The cultural sectors in China that will be most subject to reform in this convergent 
environment include media, advertising, tourism, and education.  
 
China Imploding? 
In late 2002 Newsweek devoted a special issue to China. Entitled ‘The Five Faces of China: Can Beijing and the World 
Handle the Country’s Split Personality?’, the issue led off with a piece by Washington-based academic Minxin Pei who 
took issue with claims about the cohesiveness of the Chinese nation. Pei asserted that the imagined unity of the country 
has fragmented into at least five different parts: the affluent coast, the north-eastern rust belt, the margins of Tibet and 
Xinjiang, the hinterland, and the Chinese Diaspora.  
In a world that has witnessed numerous independence movements and sovereignty claims over the past 
decade, this does not sound like an extraordinary proposition. However, despite the material evidence of fragmentation 
there is unwillingness on the part of many Chinese, both within China and in the Diaspora, to acknowledge that the 
Middle Kingdom is no longer a totalising entity. Minxin Pei wrote that the suggestion of a Chinese nation coming apart 
at the seams is incomprehensible to many, 
 
For those who know China well, there is no greater sin than to suggest that the country does not make sense as 
a single colossus. Wonder aloud if it would be better off being chopped into smaller and more manageable 
states, and your Chinese friends will respond with horrified looks and fierce rebuttals. You will be told, most 
likely, that different standards apply to China. Size matters.  
       (Pei 2002, p. 8) 
 
Pei’s article, a straightforward account of the complex nature of change, was supplemented by other stories concerning 
China’s transformation. This special issue of Newsweek dealt with a wide range of issues: consumerism, China’s rocket 
science industry, urban yuppies, shifting populations, unemployment, AIDS, the Tibet problematic, the Diaspora, 
expatriate artists, and the Chinese military build-up. These are important developments that illustrate the complexity of 
the ‘Chinese puzzle’ that presents itself to the global community.  
The Newsweek special issue was by no means a comprehensive portrayal. Curiously, Newsweek did not feature 
reports on a number of key issues, such as: the ramifications of China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation, the 
challenge of the knowledge economy, and the changing role of its communications media. These represent important 
problematics, pivotal to the resolution of many of the material crises identified in the reports. The WTO accession, 
which came into effect on December 11, 2001, constituted an international relations watershed, more significant in 
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terms of institutional change than the Open Door Policy that followed the demise of Maoist isolationism. The WTO 
was the hot topic of 2001-2002 but it rated only passing mentions. Likewise, China’s policy response to the knowledge 
economy is critical to its competitiveness, and hence its capacity to challenge the ‘advanced’ economies (Dahlman & 
Aubert 2001). The eventuality of the knowledge-based society, the key issue of the APEC summit in Shanghai in 2001, 
wasn’t newsworthy for Newsweek. As for the communications media, the glue that both hold all the pieces together, 
and the means to translate technological progress into the language of development, they too were absent. 
My paper is therefore meant as a corrective to these omissions. It presents some alternative propositions about 
the nature of culture, and of cultural change in China. It forms into an argument about the uses of culture that begins in 
the mists of the dynastic period, shifts to the great revolutionary period of socialism, and finally reaches a crisis point in 
the contemporary era of Internet and wireless applications. I sketch out two conceptual models. The first is what I will 
call the ‘chaos-order-complexity’ continuum, while the second is the ‘culture-services-knowledge’ paradigm. Due to 
considerations of space I have been sparing in using examples to illustrate the various sectors that are brought together 
in this discussion. In doing this I am assuming that the reader will have some familiarity with contemporary Chinese 
realities. In the final sections I will draw the arguments together into propositions concerning relationships between 
global integration, creativity, and the knowledge economy.  
The ‘chaos-order-complexity’ continuum addresses concerns about the nature of change stemming from long-
held fears of fragmentation and social disorder. I use the term ‘continuum’ because it signifies a progression but also 
indicates interdependent relationships between chaos (luan), order (zhi), and complexity (fuza). There is a historical 
dimension to this account and at various junctures each of these terms moves to central focus. While I don’t directly 
address ‘complexity theory’, my take on complexity is influenced by Hodgson (2000: 89), who notes ‘a long-run 
tendency in modern economic systems towards greater complexity, driven by powerful economic forces and leading to 
the widening of markets and greater product diversification’.  
The ‘culture-services-knowledge’ paradigm, on the other hand, begins in the contemporary era at a point in 
time when complexity begins to supersede certainty and services shift from being a residual commodity category to 
assuming a leading role in the wealth of nations (Allen and du Gay 1994). The argument rests on two premises. First, 
that the term culture has a broader application than aesthetic works, artefacts, traditions, and ways of life (see Williams 
1976). Second, that economics and culture are not separate domains, but are interdependent and complementary.  
 
Chaos-order-complexity 
 
The first of my two models takes us back into the history of China, a country whose leaders have been obsessed by a 
fear of chaos and turmoil for many centuries. However, while chaos remains a strong motif in the contemporary psyche 
of national unity, its potency as political rhetoric derives from its counterpoint, ‘order’ (zhi). It is well known that China 
is identified as Zhongguo, literally the ‘middle kingdom’. More than anything else, this is a testimony to Chinese 
xenophobia. The ethnocentrism of Han majority achieved even greater symbolic strength by the practice of erecting 
walls to keep out barbarians, just as contemporary rulers now seek to construct Internet firewalls to keep out crypto-
barbarians. Of course barbarians - most spectacularly in the case of the Mongols in the 13th century - did invade China, 
and stayed to rule. Other less troublesome foreigners came to pay tribute to emperors, or to conduct trade. For instance, 
the Song Dynasty (960-1279) is considered to represent the pinnacle of Chinese cosmopolitanism, while the mid-Qing 
dynasty (1644-1912) is also recognised as another period of great stability.2  
During the mid-nineteenth century order turned to chaos. The Taiping rebellion (1850-1864) produced turmoil 
in the form of a revolution against secular authority. The Taiping’s cry of da guan (smash the official) echoed the 
French revolution’s attacks on the aristocracy, but more importantly it prefigured a strategy of using revolutionary 
rhetoric and chaos to overturn the social system and the social order. A hundred years later Mao Zedong’s incitement to 
mobilise class struggle and mass movements were examples of chaos exploited for crude political advantage. The base 
tactic employed during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) was to use the dissipative energies of 
youth against the elite power structure. Spence (1990, p. 606) writes of this, 
 
For years the young had been called upon to lead lives of revolutionary sacrifice, sexual restraint, and absolute 
obedience to the state, all under conditions of perpetual supervision. They were repressed, angry, and aware of 
their powerlessness   
 
The Cultural Revolution was a case of politics out of control. Chinese historiography now explains the turmoil of those 
times as an aberration in the statecraft of socialism.  Furthermore, to justify its legitimacy the Chinese Communist Party 
frequently promotes the virtue of order as the great achievement of its rule. Achieving order through coercion and 
control became standard operating procedure for party officials during the high tide of Maoism during the 1950s. Franz 
Schurmann’s classic work Ideology and Organization in Communist China, written in 1966, provides us with a detailed 
account of the emergence of the ‘command and control state’. His description echoed a French writer who was at that 
time formulating a radical thesis on government and power. Michel Foucault saw government as ‘the conduct of 
conduct’ - a ‘form of activity aiming to shape, guide or affect the conduct of some person or persons’ (Gordon, 1991, p. 
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2).  Many China watchers have accordingly viewed the ‘politics-in-command’ policies of the 1950s as state domination 
over all aspects of social life. An extreme modality of power, domination exists when subjects have little room for 
manoeuvre. However, the political control system suffered from dissipative tendencies. It was just too hard to maintain 
a police state.  
While the extent of political domination was uneven throughout the entire Maoist period (1949-1978), 
Foucault’s conceptualisation of governmentality can be applied more broadly to the practice of statecraft by which the 
modern Chinese state has attempted to train, reform, and mould its population. The programmatic moulding of attitudes 
was supplemented with information control achieved through a system of vertical networks. The state information 
system attempted to concentrate all knowledge together as if in a single head. Information formed a basis for power and 
access to ‘important’ information was a privilege accorded elite party members. ‘Processed’ information for the masses 
was meanwhile dispensed by propaganda workers (officials -- ganbu), reinforced by study sessions and teachers 
(engineers of the soul -- linghun de gongchengshe), disseminated by the media (the mouth and throat of the Party -- 
houshe), and performed by cultural workers (wenyi gongzuo zhe).  
We might also suggest that order was reinforced by strategic ‘knowledge management’ combined with a re-
versioning of central elements of traditional culture. The Chinese Communist Party purposively deployed normative 
mechanisms, invoked in oppositions such as modern/backward, progressive/reactionary, and scientific/feudal. The 
manner in which these oppositions were posed, moreover, constituted a mechanism by which culture would act on the 
mentality of Chinese subjects.  In other words, such oppositions were not necessarily antagonistic, but rather were 
utilised with the intention of changing the beliefs and regulating the conduct of the masses according to a gradient by 
which people could inspire to reform themselves and become politically pure subjects. The mechanism of dialectics, as 
a trajectory of development, was rewired on to the existing philosophical monism of traditional China and offered to 
the Chinese masses as a science of progress.3  
The genesis of complexity -- the third stage in our continuum -- can be located in the political thaws of the 
1980s that followed Deng Xiaoping’s accession to the leadership. These liberalisations are generally referred to as the 
‘emancipation of the mind’ and the ‘culture fever’ movements (Brugger and Kelly 1990; Wang 1996). They point 
towards a more modern form of governmentality by which states have sought to stimulate productivity and 
consumption by allowing greater social autonomy (Foucault 1988). The intellectual fervour of the mid-1980s is 
therefore an important landmark, symbolising an unprecedented challenge to the CCP fountainhead of knowledge. 
Postmodernist theory and Western post-Marxism were refashioned and formatted to explain China’s changing society. 
New theoretical models of science and knowledge deriving from Western intellectuals such as Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos 
and others were catalysts in debates that challenged the notion that reality could be known and grasped directly. For 
many Chinese intellectuals this represented a discrediting of Marxism-Leninism. If there was no such thing as a reality 
that exists prior to, and independent of thought, how then could there be a fixed locus of truth? 
In trying to interpret what was useful in orthodox Marxism, many scholars turned to the so-called ‘three 
theories’ -- systems theory, cybernetics, and the theory of communication -- and the works of Daniel Bell and the 
futurologists, John Naisbitt and Alvin Toffler. The ideas of Bell, a non-Marxist, were particularly influential in debates 
about the shape of culture in China and ultimately formed a bridge for the reception of Frankfurt School ‘critical 
theory’. Bell’s ‘post-industrial society’ thesis, with its notion of stages of development and its condemnation of mass 
culture, sat easily with many critics in China looking for an alternative to official Marxism. In spite of Bells’ eschewing 
of Marxism, critics managed to link his theory with Marx’s analysis of the determining role of the productive forces 
(Brugger and Kelly, p. 37). The post-industrial thesis therefore sat easily with the technological determinism emerging 
from the Chinese Academy of the Social Sciences at the time. Bell’s theory of a transition from a goods producing 
economy to a service economy had an echo of the utopianism of communism -- the population would be delivered from 
their backwardness and the intellectual stratum would assume a leading role in the professional and technical class.  
However, while these new debates stimulated the grey matter of Chinese intellectuals, the impact did not 
reflect on the grand canvas of ideology. Despite its penchant for dialectics, Chinese socialism was, and remains, 
predicated on a linear model of progress supported by five-year plans. The high church of Marxist-Leninism, fortified 
by Deng Xiaoping’s breakthrough concept of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’, remained absolutely hegemonic. 
Rather than clarifying the actual characteristics of the regime, however, the imprecision of this term reflected the 
Politburo’s equivocation in relation to substantive social liberalisation. During the past two decades the Chinese 
Communist Party has witnessed a series of cosmetic policy shifts that have hinted at greater pluralism but have 
ultimately delivered confusing signals. In theory the CCP presides over a socialist state; in reality, however, it 
represents an embodiment of different political, economic and social philosophies. Outwardly, the social system 
manifests the hierarchical bureaucratisation of Chinese socialism; on the other hand, within the social body, and in 
many facets of policy, one finds competing elements of neo-authoritarianism, Confucianism, and liberalism. As Deng 
Xiaoping so eloquently explained in relation to the market reform, it really didn’t matter what colour the cat was, the 
bottom line was that it caught mice. 
While there was confusion in clearly identifying the philosophy of the socialist market economy, the really 
key period in which complexity became institutionalised in the national psyche occurred during the late-1990s as China 
inched closer to formal integration with the global marketplace. For most of this period it seemed to many observers as 
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if China’s accession to the world stage was endlessly deferred (Keane 2002). In fact, the longer WTO accession was 
postponed, the more it became a symbol of national desire. Its culmination, along with the success of the Beijing 
Olympic bid, unleased a frenzy of publicity. This national celebration of global acceptance in turn deflected attention 
from the very acute problems China was confronting, or would confront as a result of realising its dream of fully-
fledged participation in the global trading community. One of the key areas would be the changing relationships under 
global integration between the state-managed culture and media sectors, the potentially dynamic service sector, and the 
Chinese knowledge-based economy. 
 
Culture-services-knowledge 
 
Globalisation cuts across all spheres of activity with varying degrees of impact. In this context the culture-services-
knowledge paradigm is a consequence of global economic integration. The tendency in modern economic systems is 
towards greater complexity. Global institutions and firms drive economic complexity through market expansion and 
greater product diversification. However, due to its self-imposed insulation from global markets, the Chinese cultural 
sphere has not been subject to external stimulus and pressure to innovate. That is, until recently. With the relationship 
between culture and economy undergoing change globally, flow-on effects are felt in China. The fragmenting of 
cultural consumption based on income, generation, marital status, and gender has increased the capacity of culture to be 
commodified and offered as services within niche markets. This fragmentation has been aided by the 
internationalisation of cultural industries and new electronic distribution platforms such as satellite television and the 
Internet that are impervious to national boundaries. However, the move to commodification as the major means of 
exchange in society adds new levels of complexity as well as new levers of control. 
The culture-services-knowledge paradigm is brought into focus by the presence in China of multinational 
companies that trade in information and symbolic content that is not directly ideological in the same way as the 
traditional mass media. Industries such as online information services, of which China Online is a very potent example, 
are often born of media, and are increasingly run by people with media and public relations backgrounds. These 
cultural intermediaries illustrate the tensions and interconnections between 'culture', 'service' and the 'knowledge 
economy'. Furthermore, these industries depend on cultural specificity to a greater extent than other services like 
finance, health and telecommunications. Thus, their internationalisation (e.g. their import into China) is subject to 
greater degrees of negotiation or filtering through cultural screens than in many other service sectors. When Lyric 
Hughes started China Online in the late-1990s, it gave away its content for free. That was until 2001, when it entered 
into an arrangement with Clickshare that required users to pay for its information services. It now provides a wide 
range of customised columns, reports and commentaries, even partnering with the Chinese economic publication 
Caijing, itself in the Chinese courts in 2002 for publishing unsubstantiated reports of a Shenzhen real estate company. 
Information is more readily available, and its rapid dispersal has a particular flow-on effect on markets. 
The rapid surge in Internet usage, despite the government’s crude attempts to regulate content, gives rise for 
optimism about the future of Chinese information and communication industries. In addition to the fast developing 
electronic media sector (cable broadband, wireless, satellite and Internet), there is rapid growth and cross-sector 
integration between advertising, tourism, and education. While these fours sectors will always be subject to varying 
degrees of state control in relation to content -- and while they embody elements of passive consumption, manipulation, 
and, in the case of education, regimented conformity -- they are increasingly service industry sectors. They rely heavily 
on cultural intermediaries, working across the promotional and public relations sectors, whose role is to manage, or 
attempt to manage, the relationship between producers and consumers. In this sense, it is the ‘experiential’ content 
embodied within the product or service that drives production and consumption. Slater (2002) points out that the 
advertising industry is not concerned with the product per se but rather the properties (material and symbolic) as they 
are perceived by identifiable categories of people in the act of consumption. In this sense tourism markets 
‘experiences’. It too has emerged as a new growth industry, with a dedicated satellite television travel channel now 
targeting the needs of mobile, affluent Chinese with more free time than ever before. Education, once a universal 
service designed to bring all Chinese to understand their relationship with the truth of socialism, is a commodity that is 
desired by anxious parents of the one-child generation. Prestige universities such as Beijing University, Qinghua 
University, and Fudan University have partnered with overseas institutions to contract overseas experts to add value to 
their courses, whilst overseas providers such as Berlitz, eKnowledge Group Inc., and the South Ocean Development 
Corporation have moved directly into the provision of educational content, both on-line and on-site.  
The services model is a way of thinking about the role of the cultural and media sectors in China -- not just 
propaganda services for the government to educate and inform the masses but generators of intellectual property, 
national cultural brands, and taxation revenue.  The global shift toward service industry expansion is attributed to 
factors including competing and complementary economic activities, literate and affluent populations with evolving 
consumer needs, technological infrastructure, and internationalised communication networks. Central and provincial 
governments in China have recognised the crucial developmental role of these services in the context of knowledge-
based economy planning. The World Bank meanwhile estimates that there will be a gain of 90 million jobs in Chinese 
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service industries in the next decade as traditional manufacturing declines relative to GDP and more people are enrolled 
in lifelong education (Dahlman and Aubert 2001). 
The global knowledge society however does not come without political costs. As it is often said, ‘knowledge 
wants to be free’. However, it is out of the scope of this paper to draw attention to the potential of new media to disrupt 
the hegemony of the Chinese Communist Party. Despite the risks of information anarchy, the Chinese government has 
embraced ‘informatisation’, a term its uses to refer to the social uptake of new information technologies such as the 
Net. Importantly, the new media facilitate the growth of the knowledge economy through customised distribution of 
‘informational’ content. The core promise of the informational lies in the kind of work involved in information 
production, not the dreary repetition of dogma and cant, but 'symbolic-analytical- services' (Reich 1991). These kinds 
of practices are regarded as the key to wealth in the knowledge-based society of the 21st century. 
 
Markets, Knowledge and Uncertainty 
 
It might seem like a statement of the obvious, but the key difference between the China of thirty years ago and the 
China of today is the market. Markets, and particularly markets for creative commodities, are sophisticated 
organisations. According to advocates of markets, they work best if information flows freely and if people trust one 
another. And they work best if there is enough competition to drive innovation. Ideas such as innovation and the price 
mechanism were once considered blasphemous. Under the variety of socialism advanced by the Great Helmsman Mao 
Zedong, the market was distrusted: capitalism was viewed as a flawed system. Until Deng Xiaoping’s synthesis of a 
‘commodity economy with Chinese characteristics’ rehabilitated the market, there was no way to go forward for 
markets.  
This discussion of market reform moves us forward to look at ‘creative industries’ in China. The term 
‘creative industries’ was first articulated as a way of integrating sectors of the British economy where creative 
intangible inputs add more economic and social value than manufacturing. The term has also been taken up in a variety 
of international contexts. For instance, Jack Valenti (2002), Chairman and CEO of the Motion Pictures Association of 
America says, 
 
In 2001, the creative industries, which include theatrical films, TV programs, home video, DVDs, business 
software, entertainment software, books, music and sound recordings contributed more to the U.S. economy 
and employed more workers than any single manufacturing sector, including food and kindred products, 
industrial machinery and equipment, electronics and other equipment, fabricated metal products, and 
chemicals and allied products. 
  
The concept of creative industries has yet to achieve purchase in Chinese intellectual or policy soil. The most probable 
explanation is that ‘creativity’ is itself problematic in relation to cultural production in China. With a history of 
inducing social conformity through rote education, and more recently political study, the Chinese government has 
established a distrust of independent thinking and creativity. There is a fear that too much autonomy will lead China 
back to chaos.  
Creative industries markets are inherently complex and subject to technological innovations. They are prone to 
the vagaries of consumer demand, making the commissioning of successful films, television, and other entertainment 
content extremely risky and costly. In relation to the culture-services-knowledge paradigm, creative industries -- at 
least the core creative industries of media, software, and advertising -- are founded on the exploitation of intellectual 
property rights. This economic reality has created pressures on the Chinese government to regulate software piracy and 
educate those working in the creative industries. The commodification of culture and information, while a central 
component of the new economy, brings with it a transnational regime of control. The U.S. Congress, lobbied 
extensively by the Motion Pictures Association of America has used China’s WTO accession as a lever to force the 
Chinese government to nurture a culture of compliance. As Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite (2002, p. 106) observe 
in relation to the long-term rationale of international pressure: 
 
Naturally, it was important for the U.S. to secure better protection for its intellectual property in China. More 
fundamentally, it wanted to ensure that the Chinese entrepreneurs of the future would respect the rules of 
global information capitalism.  
 
Supranational policing thus seeks to discipline the disruptive practices of China’s cultural intermediaries and the 
thousands of ‘non-cultural’ traders who just happen to be passing off pirated software. However, the effect of 
international pressure is likely to be mostly symbolic. With new audio-visual production technologies such as the 
Internet, DVDs, CD-Rom, and MP3 software now enabling unprecedented scope for storage, replication and 
distribution of content the problem of systemic duplication of product is pervasive. This creates impediments for artists 
and producers to sell their product in the marketplace. Allied to this, due to the current official preoccupation with 
integrating production and distribution of content -- a legacy of bureaucratisation of the creative process -- there is 
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subsequently a lack of a dual-tier creative industries infrastructure whereby independent ‘creatives’ develop cutting-
edge ideas and applications that can be sold to major players. Because of a lack of financial incentives, producers in 
China prefer to exploit existing copyright than take risks and develop innovative products and services.  
 
China and the WTO: a Wildcard for Change  
 
China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation represents a wild card for its creative industries. Much has been 
written and said over the past few years about the convoluted process by which China won admission, and the predicted 
effect on farmers, factory workers, and state-owned enterprises. The official verdict in the lead up was that accession 
was a win-win scenario, with the government media regularly cranking out the good tidings (Zhao 2003; Lee 2002). 
However, WTO accession was not something that China had the power to deny, as previous regimes might have done. 
In effect WTO entry was the inevitable culmination of the reforms that began with the ascent to power of Deng 
Xiaoping some twenty years earlier. Only this time China was committing to globalisation from a position of weakness: 
it was asking an outside institution to propel the rate of de-regulation and de-bureaucratisation of its economy. 
The WTO accession represents a moment in time where thinking about the relations between knowledge, 
information, and creative industries become clearer. In this conjuncture the relationship between content production 
and infrastructure rollout becomes important. The current reorganisation and rationalisation of creative industries 
follows a period of state investment in information and communication technology infrastructure. From the mid-1980s, 
the Chinese government had charted a course towards modernisation of the economy with an emphasis on high-
technology development zones (HTDZs).4 By the mid-1990s they had embraced in principle what Freeman and Perez 
(1988) term a ‘techno-economic paradigm’, the idea that shifts in socio-institutional norms and regulations support and 
facilitate the adoption of major new technology systems and potentialities. The industrial parks that had proliferated 
were allowed preferential treatment in relation to their operations; they were accorded special import and export 
privileges to allow them to attract raw materials and equipment; they were able to acquire loans from special 
investment banks, and they were given preferential taxation benefits.5 Human capital incentive programs were 
established to reverse the ‘brain drain’.  
The incubation of IT companies and the nurturing of computer nerds, while the R&D dream of China’s 
technocrats, does not directly account for the kind of creative content that ‘exploits’ copyright, and which is capable of 
being exported to symbolically offset the incoming flow from the global capitalist media and communications 
conglomerates -- the AOL-Time Warners, Disney, and Sony Corporations. However, developments in core information 
industries will inevitably flow into creative and service industry applications.6  This portends a digital future that will 
be brought to Chinese screens by Haier, Legend Computers, or whatever national champion seizes the day. However, 
while service industries are likely to grow, the value of core information-intensive cultural industries will depend to a 
great degree on the fostering of innovation and creativity.      
 
Concluding Remarks: Revising Paradigms 
 
In this short paper I have attempted to present a revisionist account of culture and communications in China. This 
represents a key focus of an ongoing examination of the evolving relationships between intangible forms of culture and 
tangible market activity conducted by our research team. An important question remains to be clarified: namely the 
specific nature of the hybrid system that is developing within the interstices of state policy and market development: in 
effect, how markets work within the context of cross-linking institutions and industries. This is where we must look for 
answers to China’s post-WTO transformation. In this emerging field there is a need for new conceptual tools that are 
both interdisciplinary and non-reductionist.  
In reconciling culture and economics we are pointing towards the role of knowledge, or more importantly, the 
knowledge of how to compete in a global marketplace. If China truly aspires to be a player in the 21st century world 
economy, and not just a cheap production site for foreign multinationals, the Chinese government needs to unleash the 
energies of its cultural entrepreneurs. The knowledge economy, at least in its current manifestation, is not about 
traditional guanxi (networks), which rely on a culturally specific transaction model. It is about a model of global 
business networking where information turnover is rapid, product differentiation is fundamental, intellectual property is 
paramount, and where relations between production and consumption are increasingly fluid. It entails getting rid of old 
ideas as well as acquiring new ideas, and it involves adaptation to changing circumstances. It is about acknowledging 
the interdependence of complex systems and norms that harmonise transactions across borders. In this contemporary 
disjuncture China can look to its neighbours for ideas. Singapore has recently discovered that stifling creativity and 
being obsessed with control is not compatible with nurturing knowledge-society entrepreneurs. As Raymond Lim, the 
Singaporean minister for trade and industry and foreign affairs said in July 2002, ‘We need to be more comfortable 
with greater untidiness in society. We need to celebrate diversity and appreciate that, as a government, we should not 
be overly preoccupied with trying to reduce uncertainty.’7 
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1 The reasoning behind the culture-services-knowledge paradigm forms part of a larger explanation of China’s creative 
content sector transformation that is the focus of an Australian Research Council Discovery Grant (2003-2005). I 
would like to acknowledge the intellectual contributions of my colleagues in this endeavour: John Hartley, Stuart 
Cunningham, Stephanie Hemelryk Donald, Terry Flew, and Christina Spurgeon.    
2 The dynastic period ended in 1912 when the Qing (Manchu) Dynasty finally collapsed after a long period of turmoil 
and rebellion. See Spence (1990) for a comprehensive account of the rise of Modern China.  
3 The ‘science’ of dialectical materialism was derived from the work of Marx and Engels, particularly the latter’s Anti-
Duhring.  It was popularised by Plekanov and became the official philosophy of the Soviet Union.  According to the 
Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought, it was Engels who ‘extended the scope of the dialectic to the natural world and 
proclaimed a series of completely general scientific laws which governed nature and society alike. These fundamental 
laws were: the transformation of quantity into quality whereby gradual quantitative change culminated in a 
revolutionary change of quality; the interpenetration of opposites whereby any entity is constituted by an unstable unity 
of contradictions; and the negation of the negation whereby any negative force is in its turn negated in a process of 
historical development which conserves something of the negated elements. See Bullock et al, 1988, p. 225. 
4 For an extended discussion of China’s technological upgrading and its link to the knowledge economy see Keane and 
Lin (2001) 
5 In order to solve the problem of technology deficiency, China initiated the ‘Torch Program’ in the mid-1980s (see 
Wall and Yin 1997).  The program was aimed at commercialising high-tech research and development achievements 
and providing industrial bases for high-tech industries and experimental sites for structural reform of China's 
innovation system 
6 China will allow 49% foreign investment in all services and will allow 50% foreign ownership for value added paging 
services in two years; for mobile services, 49 percent in 5 years; and for international and domestic services, 49% in 6 
years.  
7 See interview in Far Eastern Economic Review and report by Trish Saywell and David Plott (2002). 
